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ABSTRACT 
Migration can serve as an outlet for employment, higher earnings, and reduced income risk for 
households in developing countries. We use the 2004–2005 Human Development Profile of India survey 
to examine correlations between the receipt of remittances from internal migrants and human capital 
investment in rural areas. We employ a propensity score–matching approach to account for the selectivity 
of households into receiving remittances. We interpret the results conservatively due to the cross-sectional 
nature of the data. We find a positive correlation between remittances received from internal migrants and 
the schooling attendance of teens. The magnitude of the correlation is greater when focusing on low-caste 
households, and male schooling attendance in particular becomes more positive and statistically 
significant. Our findings provide a basis for establishing future research in the areas of migration and 
social protection in India.    





1.  INTRODUCTION 
The migration rate in India is on the rise (from 27.4 percent of the population in 1991 to 30.0 percent in 
2001), and employment is secondary to marriage for reasons to migrate (Deshingkar 2006). While 
international remittance receipts are substantial (US$17.4 billion in 2003), little is known regarding the 
amount of transfers received from internal migrants (World Bank 2009).
1 For households left behind, 
having a migrant leave can improve their welfare since migration frees up resources for the remaining 
household members. Remittances can additionally relax liquidity constraints. Moreover, internal 
migration offers an alternative for poor households to seek employment, seek higher earnings, and reduce 
income vulnerability relatively cheaply by migrating to areas with labor shortages or those facing 
different income distributions with respect to covariate shocks. In this paper, we examine the correlation 
of remittances received from internal migrants with teen and adult labor supply decisions, teen schooling 
enrollment, attendance, and absenteeism. We correlate remittances received and these outcomes to assess 
the potential effect of relaxing liquidity constraints on human capital accumulation. Moreover, we 
examine how the labor supply shifts with the increase in income to understand the interaction between 
teen and adult labor supply.     
There is a vast literature that measures the returns to migration and remittances on investment (de 
Haan 1999). Migration and remittances generate investments in housing, consumer durables, and 
landholdings (de Brauw and Giles 2008); shift production to more capital-intensive crops (de Brauw, 
forthcoming); and increase time spent in capital-intensive enterprises (Yang 2008). Migration and 
remittances reduce household vulnerability to shocks through off-market access to employment (Yang 
and Choi 2007; Giles 2006). Migration can also reduce poverty (de Brauw and Giles 2008).
2  
The link between migration, remittances, and human capital investment is also being established 
in the literature. An increase in household income (through the resources made available by an absent 
household member or transfer receipts) enables households to substitute leisure for consumption. Such an 
increase in income should reduce overall labor efforts of household workers. We might also expect 
concomitant declines in child labor, as studies find associations between poor human capital investment 
and imperfect credit markets (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Jacoby 1994). Baland and Robinson (2000) 
develop a dynamic theoretical model that considers the allocation of child labor subject to borrowing 
constraints. A finding from the model is that Pareto inefficient levels of child labor can arise due to 
borrowing constraints. The empirical implications of their model are overall reductions in child labor, 
provided migration and remittances sufficiently relax liquidity constraints. 
Recent studies support the theoretical predictions on child labor and schooling. Mansuri (2006) 
provides empirical evidence of increased schooling attendance, retention, and accumulated years of 
schooling, and decreased child labor among migrant households in rural Pakistan. Female headship can 
lead to the loss of accumulated schooling among girls, suggesting mothers are more protective of boys at 
the expense of girls in rural Pakistan. De Brauw and Giles (2006) demonstrate migration hinders high 
school enrollment in rural China, which is attributable to the lower return to high school education in 
migrant labor markets. They show that the opportunity cost to enroll in high school outweighs the returns 
to education above middle school by estimating the returns to education in migrant labor markets. Cox-
Edwards and Ureta (2003) demonstrate remittances received positively affect school attendance and 
retention in El Salvador. Acosta (2006) shows the receipt of remittances in El Salvador encourages child 
enrollment; however, females aged 15 and over are more likely to increase their education and reduce 
their labor supply. Yang (2008) provides evidence that remittances increase educational expenditures and 
student statuses and reduce child labor efforts. It should be noted that most of these studies focus on the 
                                                      
1 Existing studies concentrate on the documentation of migration patterns in India and their determinants (Mitra and 
Murayama 2008; Rogaly 2003; de Haan 2002; Mosse et al. 2002; Bhattacharya 2000). 
2 This finding is contrary to those found in earlier work. Barham and Boucher (1998) and Rodriguez (1998) show migration 
enhances inequality. 2 
 
returns to international migration, which likely generates greater returns than internal migration due to the 
nature of the moving costs and skills required abroad (de Brauw and Carletto 2008). 
In light of the numerous findings on migration, few have initiated work in India. In earlier work, 
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show marriage-driven migration helps smooth consumption in India. 
Twenty years later, the gap in the literature remains. One reason for the paucity of India studies is that the 
available data sets are not adequate for addressing the migration selectivity problem. Since migrants are 
unrepresentative of the general population either in ambition, skill, income, vulnerability, or other 
unobservable characteristics, they cannot be treated as a random sample. The nonrandom selection of 
households into migration can bias estimates of migration and remittance receipt impacts. Panel data can 
reduce the selection bias because behavior is observed over time for each household, allowing for the 
control of individual time-invariant idiosyncrasies. The potential for correlation between unobservable 
characteristics that vary over time and changes in migration remains an issue, however, and is often 
addressed through the use of instrumental variable and matching techniques (de Brauw and Carletto 
2008). Existing panel studies in India are often a decade apart, which can produce substantial attrition bias 
in the estimates (Foster and Rosenzweig 2008). Another explanation for the absence of migration studies 
in India is its low incidence of migration for employment.
3 Although labor mobility in India has been low 
in the past 20 years, there are several recent cases of employment opportunities by region that attract 
migrants (Deshingkar 2006).  
In this paper, we use the 2004–2005 Human Development Profile (HDP) of India survey to 
examine the correlation of remittances received from internal migrants with the intrahousehold allocation 
of labor and teen schooling. We employ a propensity score–matching (PSM) approach to account for the 
selectivity of households into receiving remittances. We interpret the estimates conservatively due to the 
cross-sectional nature of the data, although recently the PSM approach was shown to perform relatively 
well (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2006).
4 The 2004–2005 HDP was a national survey effort that 
collected a variety of information on household composition, employment, earnings, assets, consumption, 
education, and health at the household and individual levels. We are able to identify migrants’ 
demographic characteristics and remittance behavior in the last 12 months.
5 In exchange for the breadth 
of information gathered and scale of the survey, the questions on out-migration are quite limited. Specific 
details on the destinations of migrants (beyond international, same/other state in reference to the family’s 
location), migrants’ motivations for moving, and their departure years are excluded from the survey. 
We find positive correlations between remittances received in the last 12 months and teen 
schooling attendance. We see concurrent overall reductions in male adult labor supply, and increases in 
female adult labor supply (on the farm). It is difficult to identify the mechanism behind increases in 
female adult labor supply due to inadequate data detailing auxiliary labor activities, such as time devoted 
to tending animals or domestic tasks.  
We further restrict the sample to low-caste households for two reasons. First, remittances 
received by wealthier households may not be sufficient to change behavior. Second, we are ultimately 
interested in examining how migration may improve the livelihoods of the impoverished. Understanding 
this relationship is motivated by the insight of theoretical models that relate poor human capital 
investment to long-term poverty traps (e.g., Barham et al. 1995). We find the magnitude of the correlation 
between remittances received and schooling attendance of all teens is smaller and less significant than 
findings using the unrestricted sample; however, the correlation between remittances received and male 
                                                      
3 Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) recently examine the role of caste networks in reducing incentives to migrate. Their 
explanation for the low mobility in India (particularly among the poor) is the informal credit and insurance offered by caste 
networks. 
4 The HDP survey does have a first round held in 1993–1994. Unfortunately, the high attrition rate precludes its 
use. 
5 The most frequently used surveys in India collected by the National Sample Survey Organization have excluded remittance 
questions from their survey until recently. The last survey round, which includes remittance information, has not yet been 
released.  3 
 
teen schooling becomes larger and more significant. Such preliminary evidence offers support for future 






2.  DATA 
We use the 2004–2005 HDP of India survey.
6 It has information from 41,554 households (26,734 living 
in rural areas and 14,820 households living in urban areas). We focus on rural households in all states 
excluding the northeastern region and the Assam and Delhi states.
7 Table A.1 compares the composition, 
socioeconomic characteristics, and location of households by remittance recipient status. Remittance 
receipts average 18,215.30 rupees, or US$413.05, in the last 12 months prior to the survey.
8 Households 
that receive remittances tend to be wealthier in terms of owned land per capita and also have household 
heads in the Brahman and other high castes. Households that receive remittances also live in quite 
different locations on average than those who do not receive remittances. In particular, a greater number 
of recipients of remittances tend to live in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan than elsewhere. These 
figures highlight the importance of controlling for location to isolate within-state differences in the 
outcomes of remittance recipient and nonrecipient households.    
Table A.2 compares the individual education outcomes of teens living in remittance recipient and 
nonrecipient households. Approximately 66 percent of the teens in our sample are enrolled in school. On 
average, the teens in our sample missed three days of school in the last month and spent 31 hours in 
school per week. The only statistical difference in the schooling practices of teens in remittance recipient 
households is that they spend more hours per week in school. We also compare the labor supply outcomes 
of individual teens in remittance recipient and nonrecipient households in Table A.3.
9 The figures indicate 
that there is no statistically significant difference in labor supply outcomes between these two groups of 
teens except for the number of hours spent doing wage/salary work. When comparing all teenagers, the 
figures indicate that teens living in recipient households work more; however, the statistical significance 
disappears when comparing hours worked by gender.  
Table A.3 also presents differences in individual adult labor supply outcomes by remittance 
recipient status. Adult males that receive remittances actually work more days on the farm and more 
hours in a usual day; however, they are employed for fewer days in wage/salary jobs. The number of 
fewer days that males living in households that receive remittances work in wage/salary jobs exceeds the 
number of additional days they are employed in farm labor, suggesting that overall, males work less. The 
only change in female employment by remittance recipient status is a slight reduction in their hours 
worked per day. These results are likely confounded by variables underlying the selection of households 
receiving remittances. Thus, we next discuss our empirical strategy for estimating correlations between 
teen education and teen and adult labor outcomes and remittance receipts accounting for the nonrandom 
assignment of remittance recipient households.     
Empirical Strategy 
The selectivity of households receiving remittances poses challenges for identifying the effect of 
remittances received on education and labor supply outcomes. Evaluating a remittance effect is 
particularly difficult because the variables that influence economic outcomes simultaneously affect the 
receipt of remittances. PSM has been used in other contexts to address sample selectivity (Dehejia 2005; 
                                                      
6 This survey was jointly organized by University of Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research 
(NCAER). The data collection was funded by grants R01HD041455 and R01HD046166 of the National Institute of Health and 
Human Development, Bethesda, MD, USA. Part of the sample represents a resurvey of households initially conducted in the 
1993–1994 Human Development Profile of India conducted by NCAER. 
7 We exclude households from these areas because few or no rural households received remittances in the last 12 months 
from internal migrants.  
8 We use the exchange rate of 44.10 rupees per U.S. dollar provided by the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook 
(2009).  
9 Edmonds (2008) provides evidence that a substantive amount of child labor involves domestic work or tasks associated 
with household production. Since the survey does not provide data on time employed in such activities, our measurement of teen 
labor is limited. 5 
 
Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Dehejia and Wahba 1999). While a good instrumental variable is the preferred 
identification strategy, studies show that PSM performs relatively well to their experimental measures 
(McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2006; Dehejia 2005; Dehejia and Wahba 2002). We apply PSM to 
observe the correlations between remittances received and a suite of outcomes.
 10 
We define the remittance recipient indicator R, which holds the value 1 for households that 
received remittances in the last 12 months prior to the survey and 0 otherwise, with remittance recipient 
and nonrecipient households’ outcomes represented by Y
1 and Y
0. The average impact of the treatment on 
the treated (ATT) is  
  ) 1 , | ( ) 1 , | (
0 1     R X Y E R X Y E ATT , (1) 
where X is a vector of variables that characterizes differences between remittance recipient and 
nonrecipient households and explains variation in economic outcomes. Matching remittance recipient and 
nonrecipient households first involves estimating a probit regression representing the receipt of 
remittances. The regression produces predicted probabilities of receiving remittances for each household. 
These probabilities, or propensity scores, are used to match remittance recipient with nonrecipient 
households sharing similar propensity scores. We use the kernel smoothing algorithm to match a single 
recipient household with all nonrecipient households, where similar nonrecipients households’ are given 
more weight via a kernel function (Smith and Todd 2005).
11 We also impose a common support 
restriction, which only includes the treatment cases whose scores lie between the minimum and maximum 
propensity scores in the control group.
12 We use bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors after kernel 
smoothing.
13 Matching is used to remove the bias caused by unobservables that affect the receipt of 
remittances. The effectiveness of PSM rests on the conditional independence assumption: The propensity 
score used to match households is independent of the outcomes and conditional on the vector of 
observables X.      
                                                      
10 Smith and Todd (2005) show that difference-in-difference (DID) matching estimators outperform matching estimators 
that use cross-sectional data. We therefore remain conservative in the interpretation of our results since they may be biased by the 
omission of time-invariant characteristics.   
11 Our estimates are computed using the psmatch2 procedure in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). 
12 Smith and Todd (2005) note that for some samples the common support restriction can substantially reduce the bias of the 
estimate. 
13 Multiple algorithms are available to match recipient with nonrecipient households. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that 
many of these algorithms yield inaccurate standard errors. Boostrapping standard errors following the use of the kernel 
smoothing algorithm remains an exception. 6 
 
3.  RESULTS 
Determinants of Receipt of Remittances 
We estimate a probit model to evaluate the determinants of remittance receipts. We include the following 
variables in the model: household composition (the number of children, the number of adults, the number 
of married males and females); socioeconomic characteristics (the highest education level completed 
among adults; the head of household’s age; whether the head of household is of the Brahman or other 
high caste, Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim, Christian, or Sikh caste/religion category, omitting the obc [other 
backward castes] category; and owned land per capita); and state dummy variables omitting the 
Karnataka dummy variable. The state variables facilitate within-state comparisons of the probability of 
receiving remittances. Table A.4 presents the estimated parameters and standard errors from the probit 
model. The results are consistent with the insurance and bequest motives to remit supported by the 
literature (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; De la Briere et al. 2002; Hoddinott 1994). If married women 
are considered a liability, then a positive coefficient on the number of married women and a negative 
coefficient on the number of married men in the probit regression are consistent with the insurance motive 
to remit. Observing a positive effect of owned land per capita on the probability of receiving remittances 
provides evidence for the bequest motive (Hoddinott 1994). Household members may be more inclined to 
remit to wealthier households as a form of investment in their future, such as receiving an inheritance. 
Finally, the coefficients on the religious/caste dummy variables suggest that households with heads in the 
Brahman or other high castes are more likely to receive remittances than the obc, and households from all 
other religious/caste categories are less likely to receive remittances. The former shows that the role of 
ethnic social networks may facilitate sending remittances or reduce costs associated with migration 
(Azam and Gubert 2006). The latter corresponds to the literature on migration in India, which observes a 
stronger propensity of lower caste households to migrate (Rogaly 2003; Bhattacharya 2000).          
Remittances, Schooling, and Labor Supply 
Table A.5 presents the differences in the teen schooling and labor supply outcomes. The results indicate 
that there are no statistical differences in outcomes, with the exception of the hours spent per week in 
school. We find that teens in households that receive remittances tend to spend more hours per week in 
school. It is likely that remittances cause a reduction in teen domestic employment; however, our survey 
does not provide data on the time spent on these activities. When differentiating outcomes by gender, we 
find weak empirical evidence (the difference is statistically significant from zero at the 15 percent critical 
level) that the effect is stronger for male teens.   
We present differences in the labor supply outcomes of adults living in remittance recipient and 
nonrecipient households in Table A.6. Both men and women tend to increase their efforts on the farm 
when their households receive remittances. Men overall work less upon considering the reduction in days 
spent in wage and salary work. There are a few possible interpretations of the overall results. First, 
remittances may be affecting investments in complementary inputs that would increase the profitability of 
working on the farm, and thus cause increases in adult labor allocated to the farm. Existing studies, 
however, provide evidence of either the opposite effect, where migration increases capital investment 
substituting out labor (Rozelle, Taylor, and de Brauw 1999), or no effect on inputs (de Brauw, 
forthcoming). Second, it is possible that we would observe greater reductions in women employed in 
household work that receive remittances if the data were collected. Third, there also may be child-parent 
substitution patterns. Skoufias (1993) finds evidence of children-women labor substitution in domestic 
activities. Katz (1995) and Hazarika and Sarangi (2005) find girls spend more time engaged in domestic 
activities as mothers work outside of the household. Our results are consistent with child-parent 
substitution patterns. As remittances allow men to spend less days working, the demand for teen labor (in 
particular male teens) is also reduced, allowing more time to attend school. However, these results are 
weakly significant. Finally, it is also possible that the average effects are dampened by the households 7 
 
without borrowing constraints. We further explore this possibility by correlating remittance recipient 
status with the human capital and labor supply outcomes of low-caste households in the next section.    
Heterogeneous Impact of Remittances: The Role of Credit Constraints  
We reflect on whether the correlations between remittance recipient status and schooling and labor supply 
depend on the degree households are income-constrained by restricting the analysis to low-caste 
households. Low-caste households include members of the obc, the Dalit (formerly known as the 
untouchables), and the Adivasi (tribal groups or the indigenous population of India). We find the 
magnitudes of the correlations between remittance receipts and the labor supply and teen schooling of 
more credit-constrained households are greater in Tables A.7 and A.8. In particular, the magnitude of 
schooling attendance of all teens is smaller and weaker in significance than previously; however, the 
correlation between remittance receipts and male teen schooling attendance is stronger in significance and 
larger in magnitude. We also see a smaller reduction in overall adult male work and a greater increase in 
days spent working on the farm for female workers in low-caste households that receive remittances than 
in the previous section.       
 8 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
There is potential for internal migration in India to improve human capital investment, particularly among 
the impoverished. The evidence suggests that male teens, in particular, may benefit from private transfers. 
Further investigation into what motivates internal migration and remittances and the characteristics of 
these households using a panel survey can elucidate the criteria necessary for successful social protection 
programs in India. Moreover, the identification of barriers to mobility across states, particularly with 
respect to the poor and low-caste households, may be relevant for the design of future poverty-reducing 
policies. 9 
 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics by remittance recipient and nonrecipient households  
   Remittances  Difference 
 Nonrecipients    Recipients    in  Means 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  T-statistic 
Number of children (ages 0–14)  1.811 1.643  1.728 1.887  2.054** 
Number of adults (ages >21)  2.849  1.414  2.669  1.501  5.245*** 
Household size  5.420  2.629  5.146  3.095  4.256*** 
Number of married females  1.264  0.733  1.409  0.926  -7.975*** 
Number of married males  1.244  0.728  0.920  0.791  18.268*** 
Head of household's age  47.009  13.466  47.103  13.637  -0.288 
Highest education level  0.640  0.480  0.586  0.493  4.579*** 
  completed by adult           
Owned land per capita (acres)  0.409  1.006  0.513  1.079  -4.264*** 
Caste/religion of household head           
  Brahmin  0.040  0.196  0.070  0.256  -6.282*** 
  High caste  0.146  0.353  0.185  0.389  -4.549*** 
  Dalit  0.233  0.423  0.196  0.397  3.621*** 
  Adivasi  0.099  0.298  0.051  0.220  6.753*** 
  Muslim  0.086  0.280  0.089  0.285  -0.496 
  Sikh, Jai  0.016  0.125  0.002  0.046  4.673*** 
  Christian  0.016  0.127  0.013  0.113  1.079 
Remittances (rupees)      18215.30  24925.23   
States          
  Jammu and Kashmir  0.016  0.127  0.008  0.090  2.725*** 
  Himachal Pradesh  0.040  0.195  0.069  0.254  -6.134*** 
  Uttarakhand  0.012  0.107  0.022  0.146  -3.813*** 
  Punjab  0.043  0.204  0.010  0.101  6.902*** 
  Haryana  0.056  0.230  0.023  0.151  5.991*** 
  Uttar Pradesh  0.088  0.283  0.174  0.379  -12.177*** 
  Bihar  0.032  0.175  0.119  0.324  -19.070*** 
  Jharkhand  0.021  0.144  0.011  0.106  2.880*** 
  Rajasthan  0.059  0.236  0.111  0.314  -8.870*** 
  Chhattisgarh  0.037  0.189  0.022  0.146  3.405*** 
  Madhya Pradesh  0.091  0.287  0.029  0.167  9.164*** 
  West Bengal  0.049  0.216  0.052  0.222  -0.565 
  Orissa  0.058  0.234  0.054  0.225  0.834 
  Gujarat  0.053  0.223  0.030  0.172  4.195*** 
  Maharashtra and Goa  0.089  0.285  0.053  0.223  5.368*** 
  Andhra Pradesh  0.062  0.242  0.038  0.192  4.127*** 
  Kerala  0.044  0.204  0.038  0.191  1.506 
  Tamil Nadu  0.036  0.187  0.039  0.194  -0.236 
Observations  23357     1847       
Notes: The caste/religion and state categories omitted are obc (other backward castes) and Karnataka. 





Table A.2. Education outcomes by remittance recipient and nonrecipient Status 









      Hours 
work in a  
usual day 
     
          
   Mean  Std. Dev. N  Mean  Std. Dev. N  Mean  Std. Dev. N 
  All teens (nonrecipients)  16.247  44.152  8255  14.683  52.265  8255  1.618  3.355  8254 
  All teens (recipients)  18.448  47.110  692  17.759  58.510  692  1.932  3.584  692 
Difference in means (t-statistic) -1.253      -1.473    -2.356**     
  Male teens (nonrecipients)  19.383  49.760 4251 21.133  63.863 4251 2.006  3.717  4250 
  Male teens (recipients)  21.083  51.718  361  26.526  72.595  361  2.249  3.741  361 
Difference in means (t-statistic) -0.621      -1.523    -1.195     
  Female teens (nonrecipients)  12.918  37.003  4004  7.835  34.802  4004  1.206  2.866  4004 
  Female teens (recipients)  331  15.574  331  8.196  35.265  331  1.586  3.377  331 
Difference in means (t-statistic) -1.243      -0.181    -2.287**     
  Male adults (nonrecipients)  49.361  83.605  30981  125.35  125.347  30981  6.648  4.884  30847 
  Male adults (recipients)  54.632  85.968  2412  116.483  116.483  2412  6.824  4.912  2402 
Difference in means (t-statistic) -2.976***     3.180***    -3.106***     
  Female adults (nonrecipients)  29.040  60.425 30317  26.428  71.608 30317  2.619  4.066  30303 
  Female adults (recipients)  34.917  65.461 2341 27.345  73.284 2341 2.890  4.137  2338 
Difference in means (t-statistic) -4.103        -0.596       -3.106***       
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Teens include individuals between the ages of 15 and 17. Adults include individuals 
between the ages of 22 and 65 
 









   Hours 
spend per 
week in 
school      
   Mean  Std.Dev. N  month  Std.Dev. N  Mean  Std.Dev. N 
  All teens (nonrecipients)  0.660  0.474  7183  3.219  6.157  4258  30.373  10.078  4112 
  All teens (recipients)  0.644  0.479  593  3.562  6.892  338  32.147  8.998  333 
Difference in means (t-statistic)  0.803      0.328      -3.114***     
  Male teens (nonrecipients)  0.684  0.465  3853  3.364  6.244  2390  30.371  10.127  2313 
  Male teens (recipients)  0.661  0.474  327  3.647  7.005  190  32.207  9.470  188 
Difference in means (t-statistic)  0.860      -0.596      -2.403**     
  Female teens (nonrecipients)  0.634  0.482  3330  3.033  6.040  1868  30.375  10.017  1799 
  Female teens (recipients)  0.624  0.485  266  3.453  6.765  148  32.069  8.377  145 
Difference in means (t-statistic)  0.312      -0.807      -1.981**     
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Teens include individuals between the ages of 15 and 17. Adults include individuals 




Table A.4. Remittances received: Probit regression results (household level) 
   Parameter  Std. Error 
Intercept -1.390***  0.072 
Head of household's age  0.001  0.001 
Highest education level  -0.098***  0.030 
  completed by adult     
Number of children (ages 0–14)  -0.094*** 0.010 
Number of adults (ages >21)  0.015  0.016 
Number of married females  1.313***  0.049 
Number of married males  -1.434***  0.056 
Owned land per capita  0.043**  0.017 
Brahmin dummy  0.227***  0.063 
High caste dummy  0.159***  0.041 
Dalit dummy  -0.100***  0.036 
Adivasi dummy  -0.239***  0.059 
Muslim dummy  -0.137**  0.055 
Sikh, Jai dummy  -0.381*  0.227 
Christian dummy  0.092  0.128 
Jammu and Kashmir dummy  -0.347**  0.141 
Himachal Pradesh dummy  0.126*  0.068 
Uttarakhand dummy  0.075  0.102 
Punjab dummy  -0.487***  0.120 
Haryana dummy  -0.379***  0.083 
Uttar Pradesh dummy  0.0293***  0.057 
Bihar dummy  0.637***  0.066 
Jharkhand dummy  -0.028  0.115 
Rajasthan dummy  0.270  0.060 
Chhattisgarh dummy  -0.082  0.091 
Madhya Pradesh dummy  -0.368***  0.074 
West Bengal dummy  0.123*  0.070 
Orissa dummy  0.051  0.069 
Gujarat dummy  -0.171**  0.077 
Maharashtra and Goa dummy  -0.251***  0.065 
Andhra Pradesh dummy  -0.185**  0.072 
Kerala dummy  -0.309***  0.096 
Tamil Nadu dummy  0.094  0.076 
Pseudo R-squared  0.217   
Observations 25204     
Notes: The caste/religion and state categories omitted are obc and Karnataka. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  




Table A.5. Effect of remittances received on teen schooling and labor supply  
   Teen Labor (Ages 15–17)          
 All    Male    Female   
Variable  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error 
Days worked on the farm   2.839  2.130  3.190  3.181  2.262  2.999 
  last year  (8947)    (4612)    (4335)   
Days wage/salary work  2.949  2.680  5.920  4.534  -0.160  2.477 
  last year  (8947)    (4612)    (4335)   
Hours worked in a usual day  0.235  0.171  0.283  0.258  0.211  0.229 
 (8946)    (4611)    (4335)   
Enrollment indicator  -0.014  0.024  -0.028  0.033  0.002  0.039 
 (7776)    (4180)    (3596)   
Days absent from school  0.240  0.439  0.340  0.591  0.409  0.745 
  in last month  (4545)    (2367)    (1941)   
Hours spent per week in   1.493**  0.615  1.384†  0.925 0.798  0.975 
  school  (4394)     (2284)     (1869)    
Notes: Boostrapped standard errors reported with 1,000 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the 
average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.10, † p<0.15. 
 
Table A.6. Effect of remittances received on adult labor supply 
   Adult Labor (22–65)       
 Male    Female   
Variable  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error 
Days worked on the farm   4.659**  2.071  3.480**  1.741 
  last year  (33,393)    (32,658)   
Days wage/salary work  -9.693***  3.331  0.847  1.981 
  last year  (33,393)    (32,658)   
Hours worked in a usual day  0.072  0.127  0.020  0.105 
   (33,249)     (32,641)    
Notes: Boostrapped standard errors reported with 500 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the  
average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.10.13 
 
Table A.7. Effect of remittances received on teen schooling and labor supply among low-
caste households 
   Teen Labor (Ages 15–17) in Low-Caste Household    
  All   Male   Female   
Variable  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error 
Days worked on the farm   5.059*  2.718  6.238
a 6.238  3.201  4.088 
  last year  (6081)    (3117)    (2942)   
Days wage/salary work  3.671  3.193  8.148
a 5.208  -0.935 3.170 
  last year  (6081)    (3117)    (2942)   
Hours worked in a usual day  0.357*  0.212  0.421
a 0.299  0.298  0.297 
  (6080)   (3116)   (2942)   
Enrollment indicator  -0.024  0.031  -0.006
a 0.041  -0.512
c 0.054 
  (5279)   (2821)   (2428)   
Days absent from school  0.667  0.598  1.497
a,b 0.745  1.240
c 1.017 
  in last month  (3062)    (1590)    (1322)   
Hours spent per week in   1.316*  0.758  1.659*
a,b 1.072  0.085
c 1.430 
  school  (2972)     (1542)     (1276)    
Notes: Boostrapped standard errors reported with 1,000 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the 
average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.10. 
a Uttarkhand sample omitted since there are no treated observations.  
b Madhya Pradesh sample omitted since there are no treated observations. 
c Jammu and Kashmir sample omitted since there are no treated observations. 
Table A.8. Effect of remittances received on adult labor supply among low-caste households 
   Adult Labor (22–65)       
 Male    Female   
Variable  ATT  Std. Error  ATT  Std. Error 
Days worked on the farm   8.012***  2.838  4.771**  2.359 
  last year  (22,985)    (22,424)   
Days wage/salary work  -11.524***  4.305  -2.451  2.730 
  last year  (22,985)    (22,424)   
Hours worked in a usual day  0.093  0.156  -0.115  0.144 
   (22,880)     (22,411)    
Notes: Boostrapped standard errors reported with 500 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses  
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